IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF GEORGIA MACON DIVISION

ASHAMIR JOHNSON, :

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Plaintiff

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VS.

Officer BRIAN ROBINSON, Officer : NO. 5:10-CV-399 (MTT)

GAVIN RUMP, Warden GREGORY McLAUGHLIN, Deputy Warden JAMES HINTON, MACON STATE PRISON, and

STATE OF GEORGIA,

:

Defendants : <u>ORDER</u>

Plaintiff **ASHAMIR JOHNSON**, an inmate at Macon State Prison ("MSP"), has filed a *pro* se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Plaintiff also seeks leave to proceed without prepayment of the \$350.00 filing fee or security therefor pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). Based on plaintiff's submissions, the Court finds that plaintiff is unable to prepay the filing fee. Accordingly, the Court **GRANTS** plaintiff's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* and waives the initial partial filing fee pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff is nevertheless obligated to pay the full filing fee, as will be directed later in this order and recommendation. The Clerk of Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the business manager of MSP.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), a federal court is required to conduct an initial screening of a prisoner complaint "which seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity." Section 1915A(b) requires a federal court to dismiss a prisoner complaint

that is: (1) "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted"; or (2) "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief."

A claim is frivolous when it appears from the face of the complaint that the factual allegations are "clearly baseless" or that the legal theories are "indisputably meritless." *Carroll v. Gross*, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). A complaint fails to state a claim when it does not include "enough factual matter (taken as true)" to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests[.]" *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56 (2007) (noting that "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," and that the complaint "must contain something more . . . than ... a statement of facts that merely creates a suspicion [of] a legally cognizable right of action") (internal quotations and citations omitted); *see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (explaining that "threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice").

In making the above determinations, all factual allegations in the complaint must be viewed as true. *Brown v. Johnson*, 387 F.3d 1344, 1347 (11th Cir. 2004). Moreover, "[p]ro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed." *Tannenbaum v. United States*, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).

In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) an act or omission deprived him of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or a statute of the United States; and (2) the act or omission was committed by a person acting under color of state law. *Hale v. Tallapoosa County*, 50 F.3d 1579, 1581 (11th Cir. 1995). If a litigant cannot satisfy these requirements, or fails to provide factual allegations in support of his claim or claims,

then the complaint is subject to dismissal. *See Chappell v. Rich*, 340 F.3d 1279, 1282-84 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming the district court's dismissal of a section 1983 complaint because the plaintiffs factual allegations were insufficient to support the alleged constitutional violation). *See also* 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b) (dictating that a complaint, or any portion thereof, that does not pass the standard in section 1915A "shall" be dismissed on preliminary review).

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that on September 10, 2010, defendant Officers Brian Robinson and Gavin Rump entered plaintiff's cell in J-2 segregation, handcuffed plaintiff, but failed to handcuff plaintiff's cellmate. According to plaintiff, his cellmate repeatedly cut plaintiff with a razor while plaintiff was handcuffed, until Robinson pulled plaintiff from the cell. Plaintiff alleges that the above defendants violated MSP's "segregation operating procedures" and raises a failure to protect claim.

In addition to the above defendants, plaintiff sues Warden Gregory McLaughlin, Deputy Warden James Hinton, MSP, and the State of Georgia.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Dismissed Defendants

1. Warden Gregory McLaughlin and Deputy Warden James Hinton

Plaintiff makes no specific allegations against McLaughlin or Hinton. Presumably plaintiff sues them based upon their supervisory roles at MSP.

Supervisors are not responsible for the actions of subordinates under section 1983. Instead, a supervisor may be liable only if he: "(1) instituted a custom or policy which resulted in a violation of the plaintiff's constitutional rights; (2) directed his subordinates to act unlawfully; or (3) failed

to stop his subordinates from acting unlawfully when he knew they would." *Gross v. White*, 2009 WL 2074234 at *2 (11th Cir. July 17, 2009) (citing *Goebert v. Lee County*, 510 F.3d 1312, 1331 (11th Cir. 2007)). Plaintiff has not alleged that McLaughlin or Hinton have satisfied any of the above prerequisites for supervisory liability. In fact, plaintiff's assertion that the conduct of defendants Robinson and Rump violated prison procedures suggests just the opposite. Accordingly, it is **RECOMMENDED** that Warden Gregory McLaughlin and Deputy Warden James Hinton be **DISMISSED** from this action.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the plaintiff may serve and file written objections to this recommendation with the United States District Judge to whom this case is assigned **WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS** after being served with a copy hereof.

2. MSP and State of Georgia

Neither MSP nor the State of Georgia are proper defendants in a section 1983 lawsuit. *Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police*, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); *Edwards v. Wallace Community College*, 49 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir.1995). Further, the Eleventh Amendment bars a plaintiff's section 1983 action against MSP and the State of Georgia for both monetary damages and injunctive relief. *Stevens v. Gay*, 864 F.2d 113, 114-15 (11th Cir.1989). Accordingly, it is **RECOMMENDED** that MSP and the State of Georgia be **DISMISSED** from this action.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the plaintiff may serve and file written objections to this recommendation with the United States District Judge to whom this case is assigned **WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS** after being served with a copy hereof.

B. Remaining Defendants

It is well-settled that a prison official's "deliberate indifference" to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment. *Helling v. McKinney*, 509 U.S. 25

(1993); *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Prison administrators "are under an obligation to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates." *Hudson v. Palmer*, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984). Specifically, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other prisoners. *Wilson v. Seiter*, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991).

Construing plaintiff's allegations against Officers Brian Robinson and Gavin Rump liberally in favor of plaintiff, the Court cannot conclude that plaintiff's claim against these defendants is frivolous at this juncture. Accordingly, the Court will allow the complaint to proceed against these two defendants.

Accordingly, it is hereby **ORDERED** that service be made against defendant Officers Brian Robinson and Gavin Rump, and that they file a Waiver of Reply, an Answer, or such other response as may be appropriate under Rule 12 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, U.S.C. § 1915, and the *Prison Litigation Reform Act*. Defendants are reminded of the duty to avoid unnecessary service expenses, and of the possible imposition of expenses for failure to waive service pursuant to Rule 4(d).

DUTY TO ADVISE OF ADDRESS CHANGE

During the pendency of this action, all parties shall at all times keep the clerk of this court and all opposing attorneys and/or parties advised of their current address. Failure to promptly advise the Clerk of any change of address may result in the dismissal of a party's pleadings filed herein.

DUTY TO PROSECUTE ACTION

Plaintiff is advised that she must diligently prosecute her complaint or face the possibility that it will be dismissed under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to prosecute. Defendants are advised that they are expected to diligently defend all allegations made against them and to file timely dispositive motions as hereinafter directed. This matter will be set

down for trial when the court determines that discovery has been completed and that all motions have been disposed of or the time for filing dispositive motions has passed.

FILING AND SERVICE OF MOTIONS, PLEADINGS, DISCOVERY AND CORRESPONDENCE

It is the responsibility of each party to file original motions, pleadings, discovery, and correspondence with the Clerk of Court; to serve copies of all motions, pleadings, discovery, and correspondence upon opposing parties or counsel for opposing parties if they are represented; and to attach to said original motions, pleadings, and discovery filed with the Clerk a <u>certificate of service</u> indicating who has been served and where (i.e., at what address), when service was made, and how service was accomplished (i.e., by U.S. Mail, by personal service, etc.). The Clerk of Court will not serve or forward copies of such motions, pleadings, discovery and correspondence on behalf of the parties.

DISCOVERY

Plaintiff shall not commence discovery until an answer or dispositive motion has been filed on behalf of the defendants from whom discovery is sought by the plaintiff. The defendants shall not commence discovery until such time as an answer or dispositive motion has been filed. Once an answer or dispositive motion has been filed, the parties are authorized to seek discovery from one another as provided in the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. The deposition of the plaintiff, a state/county prisoner, may be taken at any time during the time period hereinafter set out provided prior arrangements are made with his custodian. Plaintiff is hereby advised that failure to submit to a deposition may result in the dismissal of his lawsuit under Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that discovery (including depositions and interrogatories) shall

be completed within 90 days of the date of filing of an answer or dispositive motion by the defendant (whichever comes first) unless an extension is otherwise granted by the court upon a showing of good cause therefor or a protective order is sought by the defendants and granted by the court. This 90-day period shall run separately as to each plaintiff and each defendant beginning on the date of filing of each defendant's answer or dispositive motion (whichever comes first). The scheduling of a trial may be advanced upon notification from the parties that no further discovery is contemplated or that discovery has been completed prior to the deadline.

Discovery materials shall <u>not</u> be filed with the Clerk of Court. No party shall be required to respond to any discovery not directed to him/her or served upon him/her by the opposing counsel/party. The undersigned incorporates herein those parts of the **Local Rules** imposing the following limitations on discovery: <u>except with written permission of the court first obtained,</u>

INTERROGATORIES may not exceed TWENTY-FIVE (25) to each party, REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS under Rule 34 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE may not exceed TEN (10) requests to each party, and REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS under Rule 36 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE may not exceed FIFTEEN (15) requests to each party. No party shall be required to respond to any such requests which exceed these limitations.

REQUESTS FOR DISMISSAL AND/OR JUDGMENT

Dismissal of this action or requests for judgment will not be considered by the court absent the filing of a separate motion therefor accompanied by a brief/memorandum of law citing supporting authorities. Dispositive motions should be filed at the earliest time possible, but in any event no later than thirty (30) days after the close of discovery unless otherwise directed by the court.

ELECTION TO PROCEED BEFORE THE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Under Local Rule 72, all prisoner complaints filed under provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are

referred to a full-time United States Magistrate Judge for this district for consideration of all pretrial

matters. In addition, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) authorizes and empowers full-time magistrate judges

to conduct any and all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and to order the entry of

judgment in a case upon the written consent of all the parties. Whether the parties elect to proceed

before a magistrate judge or retain their right to proceed before a U.S. district judge is strictly up to

the parties themselves.

After the filing of responsive pleadings by the defendants, the Clerk of Court is directed to

provide election forms to the parties and/or to their legal counsel, if represented. Upon receipt of

the election forms, each party shall cause the same to be executed and returned to the Clerk's Office

within fourteen (14) days. Counsel may execute election forms on behalf of their clients provided

they have such permission from their clients. However, counsel must specify on the election forms

on whose behalf the form is executed.

SO ORDERED, this 22nd day of October, 2010.

s/ Charles H. Weigle

CHARLES H. WEIGLE

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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